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Abstract 
Both positivists and post-positivists have misunderstood causation. By explaining why there are no 
stable and uncontested empirical invariances in IR, critical realism has pushed theoreticians and 
practitioners to reflect critically upon the conception of causation they have so far taken for granted. 
However, the original CR claim about radical asymmetry between explanation and prediction has 
turned out to be misleading. Not everything is irregular. Policy and action are future-oriented and 
require at least some predictive capacities. In this paper, I explore ways in which practically adequate 
knowledge can draw on historical analogies, social organisation of time and space, contrastive demi-
regularities and explanatory theories and models. Anticipations of future possibilities – that may 
concern even the global system as a whole – must be made systematically revisable and be reflexive ly 
aware of their own involvement in shaping the course of history. The concept of probability, too, can 
and must be rethought from this perspective. Finally, I argue that the notion of reflexive self-
regulation of social systems has interesting parallels in the theory of history, ethics and politics of 
dialectical CR, understood as a theory of freedom. 
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By the 2010s, it is agreed at least in some corners of IR that critical realism (CR) has made an 
important contribution to the study of causation. For example, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2010) in 
his widely acclaimed book depicts CR as one of the four main meta-theoretical positions in IR. CR 
emerged as a philosophy of science and social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s. It was introduced into 
IR in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Wendt 1987; Patomäki 1991; 1992). Subsequent contributions 
(Wight 1996; 2006; Patomäki and Wight 2000; Patomäki 1996; 2002; Joseph 2002; 2012; Kurki 
2008) have fleshed out further critical realist possibilities for IR research. 
Although it was grounded in realist developments in the philosophy of science in the 1960s and 
early 1970s (Bunge 1959; 1963; Harré 1970; Harré and Madden 1975; Hesse 1966), CR has most 
often been associated with the works of Roy Bhaskar (especially 1975/1997; 1979; 1986; 1989). The 
term critical realism was coined in the late 1980s. The basic CR claims have been reiterated time and 
again in various disciplinary contexts. The first claim is that ontology must come first, since it is the 
nature of objects that determines their cognitive possibilities. The search for invariant regularities is 
futile. The world must be differentiated, layered, structured, causally efficacious and open-systemic 
for our scientific knowledge about it to be possible. The real world is characterised by multiple, over-  
and plural determination and thus causation is complex. The world is not only complex but also 
changing. 
In IR in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many, especially young scholars felt that the discipline 
was in crisis. No cumulative learning seemed to have taken place (this was the topic of Lapid’s (1989) 
famous ‘third IR debate’ article).1 Despite decades of systematic efforts at identifying regular 
connections between variables related to war and peace, and conflict and cooperation, there appeared 
to be only one genuine candidate left for an empirical invariance, the democratic peace hypothesis – 
and even that was contested (for current assessments of the problems of the democratic peace 
hypothesis, and for criticism of its misuse in political practice, see Ish-Shalom 2013; Barkawi 2015). 
Various post-positivist alternatives have been proposed, but they struggle with their own 
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contradictions and dead-ends (Lapid 1989; Patomäki and Wight 2000) and have tended to develop 
into isolated fragments that do not truly communicate with the wider field (Ferguson and Mansbach 
2014). 
Before CR entered the field of IR, hardly anyone questioned empirical invariances as necessary 
for causality (Suganami 1996 being a near-simultaneous exception). It can be easily shown that the 
idea that causality involves empirical invariances presupposes closed systems. Constant conjunctions 
of events obtain only in the absence of outside intervention and qualitative variation (see Bhaskar 
1979: 160). Where a genuine, non-changing causal mechanism has been isolated, we can say that 
‘every time {A, B, C….} occurs, X follows’. But entities do change and systems are more or less 
open except when carefully set up experimental conditions obtain. 
In fact, ‘if we retain a Humean definition of causation as regular succession, we will discover 
no causal laws outside astronomy, where the incapacity of other mechanisms to deflect heavenly 
bodies from their courses approximates to a natural closure’ (Collier 1994: 34). Causal agents, 
mechanisms and complexes produce effects in open systems. Therefore it is wrong to assume that 
causality can be analysed in terms of simply necessary or sufficient conditions; yet, this is 
presupposed if one talks about empirical invariances. Empirical outcomes are the contingent results 
of a complex interplay of manifold agents, forces, mechanisms and processes. 
While the CR conception of causation in open systems explains why there are no uncontested 
empirical invariances in social sciences, it also seems to imply that there is a radical asymmetry 
between explanation and prediction. This means that we can explain the past and the present, but not 
predict the future. At first, the CR insight may appear so important – it rescues causal analysis from 
empiricism that has failed to result in cumulative learning in IR – that its downside may seem 
irrelevant. But, as pragmatists2 have insisted, is it not that adequate social science consists in our 
ability to act in, and shape, the world (Jackson 2016)? The problem is that all social action occurs in 
time and is orientated towards the future. What matters for practical action is the future. 
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What is to be done now? To answer this question – acutely urgent to all political actors – we 
need to know at least something about the ongoing processes and their probable effects and about the 
possible and likely consequences of our own actions and policies, both necessarily lying in the future 
(e.g. Chernoff 2005: 136). The key question is thus: if causation is complex and open-systemic, and 
if there is an asymmetry between explanation and prediction, does this really mean that there is little, 
if anything, that social sciences can say about the future? One consequence of the alleged asymmetry 
between explanation and prediction is that history, while of course recognised as important and in 
many ways also political, is unable to give significant guidance to policy, or to political praxis more 
generally.3 
In this article, I argue for the possibility of rational anticipations of the future while accepting 
(for the most part) the CR framework. I start by outlining the CR conception of causation and showing 
its pragmatic underpinnings. The Greek word pragmatikos means, amongst other things, ‘fit for 
action’, and action is always future-oriented. Second, I discuss in some detail, and through various 
stages, how critical realists have come to acknowledge that not everything is irregular either, and that 
action and policy require at least some predictive capacities (see also Patomäki 2010b, for a friend ly 
critique of CR as a philosophical system and practice). Action is coordinated and society organised 
in a manner that makes many things predictable. Some social mechanisms exhibit relatively regular 
empirical connections, often tending to reproduce the existing social structures, while some feedback 
loops are reflexive and possibly change-oriented. There are negative and positive feedback loops; 
some processes are self-reinforcing. Various effects can be anticipated. 
Arguably, the very existence of society is dependent on future-oriented human concepts and 
activities. This complicates the picture. Hence further steps need to be taken. Even when our 
anticipations of future possibilities concern the global system as a whole, they must be reflexive ly 
aware of their own involvement. This makes it all the more important that anticipations are 
understood as methodically revisable. The notion of probability, too, should be rethought from this 
perspective.  
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Our anticipations are ethico-politically motivated narratives about the future, systematica l ly 
grounded on causal and structural analysis, but enmeshed in pragmatic and normative considerat ions 
and discussions. I conclude by outlining how the social scientific notion of reflexive, holistic and 
future-oriented self-regulation of social systems has interesting parallels in the theory of history, 
ethics and politics of the dialectical phase of CR (Bhaskar 1993; 1994). Through human 
emancipation, our temporality changes; we learn to relate to the future in new and more reflexive 
ways. 
 
Causation in critical realism from a pragmatic and action-oriented point of view 
 
Let me start by summarising the basic CR view of causation, illuminating the implicit and explicit 
pragmatic aspects of realist causal analysis. In his seminal work A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar 
(1975/1997: 240) argued that science ‘has enormously increased our powers of intervention in and 
control over, as we say, “the course of nature”’. Because science has been so successful in practical 
terms – it works – it is a good place to start a philosophical analysis of the presuppositions of our 
historical practices. What are the conditions of possibility of scientific practices? 
What must the world be like for laboratory experiments to make sense? As is well-known, 
Bhaskar’s answer was that the scientists must be creating an artificial closure by their own labour and 
that a closure facilitates revealing the mechanisms of nature. Outside laboratory circumstances, causal 
effects are occurring only in open systems, where strictly regular law-like conjunctions are difficult 
to find. This necessitates the key distinction between causes/mechanisms/laws, on the one hand, and 
empirical regularities, on the other hand. Causal mechanisms are transfactually efficacious across 
contexts, but their precise effects in open systems are always context-dependent (being contingent 
upon what other mechanisms are at play, etc.). 
In all his books, Bhaskar insisted that causal structures and mechanisms can exist and act not 
only where (i) no empirical regularities prevail but also (ii) where no human perception occurs. We 
6 
are dependent on, and part of, the cosmos, but the cosmos has evolved and exists quite independently 
of us humans. Causation cannot be reduced to the human perception of it. Thus Bhaskar (1975/1997: 
5, 24, 34–35, 48, 148) criticised in strong words various forms of empiricism for their 
anthropocentrism. Sometimes Bhaskar tended to take his criticism of other philosophical positions a 
bit too far, however. Consider, for instance, his puzzlingly critical and, simultaneously, approving 
discussion of John L. Mackie’s (1974) famous account of cause as an INUS condition (an insufficient 
but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition). 
While recognising the importance of the pragmatic context of picking out a particular factor or 
thing as the main cause of a particular outcome, Bhaskar nonetheless claimed that the choice was not 
up to the researcher to make: 
By contrast, non-anthropomorphic generative analyses can immediately explain why it is 
that we pick out the particular factor that, in the pragmatic context of our concerns, we 
do: namely, because it is the factor which, in the real context of the genesis of the event, 
made the difference, tipped the balance, produced the outcome. (Bhaskar 1979: 207, n. 
23) 
Mackie’s standard example concerns a fire that has partly destroyed a house. Experts conclude that 
the fire was caused by an electrical short-circuit within the house. A number of other INUS conditions 
were involved in generating the fire, such as the presence of flammable material and oxygen, and the 
absence of adequate sprinklers. 
What we single out as the cause depends largely on our practical capacities and expectations of 
normality. For instance, the presence of the oxygen, too, can be seen as the cause of the fire, say in a 
laboratory or in a factory, where special precautions are taken to exclude oxygen (Mackie 1974: 119). 
All INUS conditions are real and implicate real powers (structured entities with the power or tendency 
to manifest particular characteristic properties X and produce outcomes O). Indeed, what makes the 
relevant difference depends very much on the pragmatic context.4 
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The main reason why we should nonetheless follow Bhaskar, to a degree, in stressing the 
importance of ‘the real context of the genesis of the event’ is largely ethical. As Rom Harré (1986: 
89) has explained, if we read the realist manifesto ‘Scientific statements should be taken as true or 
false by virtue of the way the world is’ as an ethical principle it would run something like this: ‘As 
scientists, that is members of a certain community, we should apportion our willingness or reluctance 
to accept a claim as worthy to be included in the corpus of scientific knowledge to the extent that we 
sincerely think it somehow reflects the way the world is’. A false claim can be useful for some 
(legitimate or illegitimate) purpose. Truth cannot be reduced to usefulness but constitutes a higher 
virtue. Thus the realist perspective inspires the openness of mind and a movement towards deeper 
levels: from those things that we can readily see or use towards postulating new deeper-level entities 
and processes. 
To sum up, the identification of particular causes is characteristically based on pragmatic 
considerations, even when the real causal powers are quite independent of us humans. The technica l 
aspect of science represents only a limited, partial and historically restricted human interest (Bhaskar 
1986: 229), but this aspect is nonetheless important. Since practical manipulation of reality is possible 
only if there is some stability in the world (Woodward 2003), this admission would seem to imply at 
least some predictability. Yet, practical adequacy in this sense is not the only consideration. Critical 
scientific realism stresses the role of truth and reality, also for ethical and emancipatory reasons. The 
point of science is to maximise our capacity to learn, also by way of proceeding towards deeper layers 
of reality. What must be taken into account as well, both in our explanations and anticipations, is that 
change tends to be ubiquitous at higher levels of emergence and complexity.5 
 
On rational expectations about the future  
 
The openness of natural and/or social systems does not exclude the regularity of at least some things 
and connections. The pragmatic and technical aspect of science requires a fair degree of predictability. 
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Moreover, all knowledge must be practically adequate at least to some degree for our everyday 
activities to be possible. All knowledge ‘must generate [some] expectations about the world and about 
the results of our actions which are actually realized’ (Sayer 1992: 69). 
Over time, Bhaskar tacitly revised his claims in this regard. In his early and best-known works, 
Bhaskar emphasised the radical asymmetry between explanation and prediction (Bhaskar 1975/1997: 
127; 1979: 142). Over time, however, his language softened. In Scientific Realism and Human 
Emancipation (1986: 218), Bhaskar substituted categorial asymmetry for radical asymmetry. The 
past and the future belong to different causal and temporal categories. The future is real but not yet 
determined. Bhaskar explained that well-grounded prospective explanations are rare ‘because we do 
not know which out of a myriad of possible sets of circumstances will actually materialise’ (1986: 
218–19). This new formulation means, however, that well-grounded explanatory anticipations are in 
principle possible; and it also raises the question of precisely how well-grounded our anticipat ions 
must be. In Dialectic (1993: 142-44), Bhaskar went on to argue that future is an increasingly shaped 
and structured possibility of becoming, mediated by the presence of the past: 
The future is paradigmatically shaped possibility of becoming [that, as a possibility] may 
be closer or more distant from us, more or less about, and more or less likely to be 
actualized. 
This passage introduces new considerations concerning future possibilities: their distance, 
aboutness and probability. From the 1990s onwards, many critical realists have started to reconsider 
the possibility of rational anticipations from this or related angle. For instance, Berth Danermark et 
al. (2002: 68, first published in Swedish in 1997) introduced the notion of ‘pseudo-closed system’. 
Many social organisations have causal powers to arrange social activities in a manner that generates 
some closure and thus also regularity, predictability and control. These powers can be used for 
anything from coordination of actions to manipulation of subjects. This closure is not similar to the 
one achieved in laboratory experiments, it is of a ‘spurious kind’, but nonetheless implies some 
predictability, although change is a constitutive characteristic of human societies. 
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Tony Lawson (1997: 204–13) introduced, in the field of economics, the concept of ‘contrastive 
demi-regularity’, similarly indicating the existence of partial closures in society. Contrastive demi-
regularities are about contrasts between categories or spacetime areas and are expressed in terms of 
regularities within a given range of variation with certain probability. They are not strict but 
probabilistic regularities, limited to a particular spacetime area, and liable to change. The 
identification of demi-regularities (or demi-regs) is not an aim in itself; rather, it is the task of social 
scientists to move quickly from identifying them towards analysing the deeper social structures and 
causal complexes generating these manifest phenomena. 
Nonetheless, Lawson argues that the initiation of much social scientific research depends upon 
the detection of contrastive social demi-regs. He (1997: 206-207) gives a number of examples of 
demi-regs, for instance: ‘women look after children more often than men do’; ‘a relatively small 
proportion of children from poor backgrounds in the UK continue into higher education’; ‘average 
unemployment rates in western industrial countries are higher in the 1990s than the 1960s’, and so 
on. In IR, the democratic peace hypothesis is a contrastive demi-reg: ‘since the late 19th century, 
democratic states fight much less (if at all) with each other than do other dyads of states’. Demi- regs 
require explanation; they are not in themselves explanations. 
Petter Næss (2004: 150) has further criticised the standard CR rejection of the possibility of 
(any) meaningful predictions on the pragmatic grounds that some planning must be possible. Næss 
argues that regression analysis ‘may hint at possible causal relationships that may subsequently be 
explained by theoretical reasoning and qualitative empirical research’, and that certain qualitative and 
rudimentary predictions concerning the aggregate level effects of particular policies and measures 
must be, and are, possible. In a parallel fashion, Pertti Töttö (2004) has disputed the (early) Bhaskarian 
dichotomy between open and closed systems, making a reasonable point that almost all systems – 
including our solar system, the object of Newton’s mechanical theories, often given as the main 
example of a natural closure – are in fact situated somewhere between absolutely open and absolutely 
closed systems, i.e. they are closed to a varying degree. We should, therefore, expect to find some 
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demi-regs or demi-regular schemes of development and rhythmics in society (patterns of flow, cycles, 
ratchets, spirals, etc.). Openness is a matter of degree. 
Predictability is limited, of course. CR explains why the actual is only a part of the real world, 
which also consists of non-actualised possibilities and unexercised powers of the already existing 
structures and mechanisms that are transfactually efficacious in relatively open/closed systems. 
Furthermore, emergence is also real. It is possible that new powers, structures and mechanisms 
emerge, and the existing ones may disappear.6 While particular geo-historical powers, structures and 
mechanisms may generate some predictability via social organisation and/or via unintended 
consequences of multiple actions in social systems, and while higher strata of social organisation can 
also use knowledge about lower-level demi-regs in achieving further predictability, or in making 
some planning possible, things can and do change. 
These limitations to predictability notwithstanding, the various degrees and levels of closure 
that we can find in society co-enable systematic futures studies. I have argued (Patomäki 2006) that, 
like a historian, a futurologist (i) explains the development of various conjunctures and compounds; 
(ii) specifies boundary conditions for the existence and transfactual efficacy of particular social 
agents, structures and mechanisms; and (iii) develops a geo-historical narrative up to a relevant point. 
Historical analogies, too, can be illuminative when they are rooted in the identification of similarit ies 
in underlying causal structures and processes across space and time. 
Given relative closures at different levels of social organization and systems, many things are 
connected in a regular fashion, and social systems exhibit some, even if only limited, predictability. 
Regularities generated by social systems can be brought about by homeostatic causal loops (often 
somewhat blindly, as in the reproduction of class structure via the educational system), self-regulat ion 
through feedback (often quasi-mechanically, as in markets) and reflexive self-regulat ion 
(deliberately, for instance through budgets and laws or targeted activities such as social work). Future 
is real but not yet determined and thus consists of a multiplicity of different possibilities. It unfolds 
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through various transformative events and nodal points, themselves presupposing particular concept-  
and action-dependent structures. Geo-historical processes can be self-attenuating or self-reinforcing. 
 
Historical analogies, explanatory models and scenarios about possible futures  
 
So far, I have argued that social systems exhibit some, even if only limited, predictability, as 
recognised by a growing number of critical realists. Historical analogy and scenarios are 
methodological tools to actualise the possibility of anticipating possible and likely futures in a rational 
manner. The immediate objection is that history never repeats itself. Can we really learn from history? 
We know that simple horizontal historical analogies, often staying at the rather superficial level of 
one-sided interpretation of actual events, such as ‘Munich 1938’ or ‘Cuba 1958/59’, have almost 
invariably misguided the decision-makers (Khong 1992: 7). 
Temporal social contexts – even when the relevant powers, structures and mechanisms endure 
across contexts – are always different in some regard. Action, by definition, involves the possibility 
of doing otherwise; and powers, structures and mechanisms tend to change, sometimes slightly, in 
some cases thoroughly. Occasionally, a small difference can suffice to make a big difference in 
outcome (processes can be non-linear). However much the contemporary geo-historical context may 
resemble the period from 1871 to 1914, or the 1920s and early 1930s, there will be no simple 
replication of the First World War or the rise of Mussolini and Hitler. 
Nonetheless, there can be processes and tendencies that are similar in some ways. Historica l 
analogies are only partial; and they idealise and abstract from their source. A historical analogy is 
best viewed as a candidate for illuminating some essential characteristics of the geo-historica lly 
evolving whole under study. In each case, something more is needed to fully understand the relevant 
whole. A good explanatory model must rely on a variety of historical and theoretical sources, as do 
scenarios about possible futures built on them. Over-reliance on one source can be misleading and 
problematical. This is especially true for historical analogies. 
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Social scientific research, therefore, starts with a broadly pluralist set of interesting candidates 
for a plausible explanation. It eliminates and refines them step by step until only a contracted range 
of fully endorsed iconic models is left. This is the reductive approach to model-building (Rescher 
1987: 33–34) Analogies are based on some similarities between (i) properties or outcomes of a known 
case and (ii) less familiar explanandum. However, historical analogies are always complex and open 
to different interpretations. If the eras are in some important regards dissimilar, we need to know 
whether another characteristic or outcome of the first era is also likely to belong to the contemporary 
era. In every historical analogy, there are both horizontal and vertical relations. Horizontal relations 
concern similarities and differences between the historical eras at the level of actual events, trends 
and developments, while vertical relations concern relevant causal mechanisms and processes within 
them (as well as the possible causal connections between them) (see Hesse 1966: 58–64). 
In establishing the degree of validity of an analogy, it is essential to study especially vertical 
relations by building explanatory models of the structural underpinnings of significant 
similar/contrastive processes, trends or outcomes in both eras. A historical analogy is claiming some 
but not all essential similarities. There are idealisations and there are abstractions. A pure idealisat ion 
has all the relevant characteristics of its source subject, but at least some of them are, according to 
some scale of value, more perfect than the source subjects’ properties. Abstraction simplifies. If the 
source subject has the relevant properties p1...pn, then an abstraction has the properties pj...pk (1 < j < 
k < n); that is, fewer than its source subject (Harré 1970: 41–42). 
Max Weber’s ideal types are a case in point. For Weber, ideal types offer an ideal picture of 
events, types of action, and social relationships, by an ‘analytical accentuation’ of certain elements 
of reality. In more dialectical terms, one can also talk about abstraction as isolation in thought of a 
one-sided or partial aspect of an object. It is important to keep in mind what we abstract from, and 
whether or not the abstraction preserves the essential properties of the object (Sayer 1992: 86–87). A 
practical judgement about this requires detailed knowledge about the substance and relies on various 
epistemic criteria. All practical judgements are fallible. 
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Historical analogies and structural explanations can be used to build scenarios about possible 
futures. Scenario is a description of what could possibly happen. Scenarios as such are not predictions. 
They start with an analysis of the existing structures and processes and their inherent possibilit ies, 
coupled with the assumption that futures remain open until a particular possibility is actualised. 
Scenarios can utilise information about contrastive demi-regs (including various trends) but 
presuppose qualitative knowledge about natural mechanisms, social contexts, causal complexes, and 
links between the different processes that together account for world history. 
 
An example of historical analogy and related scenarios 
 
To give a focal example, consider the possibility that the contemporary era may be in some important 
regards similar to the era of 1870–1914 (Patomäki 2008). Before 1914, the world economy was in 
many dimensions as highly integrated as it is today. Some institutional arrangements, such as the 
euro, have effects similar to those of the Gold Standard, which prevailed until 1914. Moreover, the 
combination of policies of free trade and free movement of capital is similar to the regime that existed 
before World War I. There are several further and quite remarkable resemblances: rising inequalit ies, 
rising nationalism, financialisation and the resulting dominance of finance, turn to quasi-imper ia l 
practices, and return of geopolitics. This list, which can be extended, constitutes a prima facie case 
for a partial historical analogy. 
Although there are also differences between the two eras, various vertical similarities further 
ground the analogy, including: mechanisms and processes of uneven, contradictory growth; 
mechanisms leading to the accumulation of wealth in relatively few hands; the related processes of 
de-democratisation; and the tendency of finance to generate booms and busts. As only limited aspects 
of historical processes may prove sufficiently similar to provide insights into future possibilities, the 
point is not to look only for in some ways similar episodes or trends, but to focus on comparable 
structural liabilities and tendencies. These may give rise to in some ways analogical outcomes, albeit 
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in a non-deterministic way. What is especially needed is a causal analysis of the currently existing 
structures and on-going processes, upon which scenarios of possible futures can be built. 
The main purpose of a partial historical analogy is to illuminate, with other relevant 
understandings of the situation, ethico-political choices and their likely future consequences. The 
point of explanation is thus pragmatic and future-oriented (cf. Jackson 2016). This future orientation 
can be explicated in terms of scenarios, i.e. narratives of possible and likely developments. The three 
world-historical scenarios {A, B, C} and their sub-scenarios I have proposed on the basis of the 
analogy between 1871–1914 and the current era (Patomäki 2008: Chapters 7 and 8) are not mutually 
exclusive, but they do differ in the ways they envisage the main dynamics of the 21st century history. 
Scenarios A are concerned with the contemporary short- to mid-term future politico-economic 
competition among great powers that is, to a certain extent, analogous to the developments that led 
to the Great War. Neo-liberalisation has meant a partial return to the past in terms of how capita lis t 
market economy works within countries and through the dynamics of the world economy as a whole. 
Some of the 21st century political economy contradictions are analogous to those of the pre-1914 era, 
often stemming from insufficient aggregate demand and attempts to export problems to other 
countries. Scenarios A are also based on an analysis of the consequences of neo-liberalisation as a 
self-reinforcing process, involving consequent securitisation and related culturally based processes 
of enemy-constructions. 
Scenarios B focus on the possibilities for emancipatory transformations towards something that 
may be called green-democratic global Keynesianism (seen as a transient state of world history and 
global governance). Scenarios B analyse the dialectics between limited-scale future wars and 
economic crises, and the possible rise of transformative actors that could respond to the problems and 
contradictions of the global political economy in terms of collective learning, and by building new 
democratic global-Keynesian institutions. Finally, scenarios C spell out the transformative 
implications of possible nuclear and climate catastrophes. 
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Assessing and revising the probability of scenarios 
 
Which of these three main scenarios is happening, if any? How likely are they? To further guide our 
practical reflections and actions, we also need to explicate the meaning of the concept of probability. 
Arguably the main meaning of probability is practical. If something is probable, it constitutes an 
approvable basis for action and choices. The concept of probability also implies that chance, in some 
sense, is involved in bringing about a particular outcome (Bartholomew 2008: 17–27). We should 
thus first distinguish between epistemological and ontological chance. 
Epistemological chance concerns uncertainty and ignorance. We may know some relevant 
things but not enough to be sure about what is going to happen. As more knowledge about the relevant 
mechanisms and processes becomes available, the uncertainty of our anticipation should decrease. 
This is not always the case, however. In his early work, Keynes (1920/2008) argued that probability 
concerns an inference from evidence/reasons to our probability-judgements. The weight of evidence 
does not necessarily change our probability estimate but may also alter our confidence in it. Learning 
more about the situation can mean that our sense of ignorance increases, implying that the weight of 
evidence and our confidence in it may in fact decrease. 
Complete knowledge may be practically unobtainable and thus uncertainty is non-redundant as 
a matter of principle. Furthermore, in open systems, relative frequencies cannot be more stable than 
contrastive demi-regs. In open systems, two or more (relatively) independent causal chains can 
coincide in a manner that is fully unpredictable; and intrinsic qualitative changes are possible as well. 
This comes close to the ontological meaning of chance. Pure chance occurs when there is nothing at 
all that has any predictive value.7 In practice, it is impossible to draw a watertight line between 
ignorance and pure chance, as there may always be a factor that has gone unnoticed. On the other 
hand, it is also important to underline that what is unpredictable at the scale or level N may appear 
quite law-like and predictable in probabilistic terms at the scale or level N+1 or N+i (i > 1). Also , 
human choices are free and unpredictable as a matter of principle, yet involve rule-following, 
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dispositions, social expectations and other things that have predictive value and can form relative ly 
regular patterns at a higher level of aggregation, complexity or organisation. Perspective and scale do 
matter. 
When studying large-scale (perhaps truly global) social systems and their possible futures, we 
can safely assume that both epistemological chance (uncertainty, ignorance, and the related lack of 
confidence) and ontological chance (accidents, independent processes coinciding, pure chance) are 
involved. Point-predictions are therefore impossible. Even probabilistic interval predictions can at 
best specify the generic type of event or process that will happen within a particular time-space-frame. 
The more precise the prediction is, however, the easier it is to falsify. This is important because 
scholar-partisans use all kinds of means to fortify their positions against falsification. As Philip 
Tetlock (2015: 4) argues: 
Without retreating into full-blown relativism, we need to recognize that political belief 
systems are at continual risk of evolving into self-perpetuating worldviews, with their 
own self-serving criteria for judging judgment and keeping score, their own stocks of 
favorite historical analogies, and their own pantheons of heroes and villains. 
This is not all, however. The problem is deeper still. The openness of social systems means that 
social beings and relations can change qualitatively. After a prediction is made, in principle anything 
in society – agents, rules, resources, practices, structures and mechanisms – can change. Often, 
societal changes happen quite independently of the prediction, posing nevertheless additiona l 
difficulties for anyone trying to predict the future. A deeper complication is that social sciences are 
internally related to their subject-matter. By learning about a prediction, actors can change their 
behaviour. Predictions can become self-fulfilling or self-defeating; they may even instiga te 
institutional transformations (for example, ecological warnings prompting political activities that lead 
to the establishment of environmental ministries and international treaties and organisations). From 
a pragmatic point of view, this reflexive involvement of predictions can be viewed as the chief reason 
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why we need them. Knowledge and the social world are intradependent. It is not only that 
anticipations can be self-fulfilling or self-denying; oftentimes, this is their very purpose. 
All this suggests two somewhat contradictory criteria for an adequate prediction: relevance and 
accuracy, on the one hand, and success in informing practical actions and shaping the world, on the 
other hand. One implication is that many predictions can only be tested – falsified – by means of 
counterfactual reasoning.8 What would have happened, had X been otherwise? X may denote 
reflexive phenomena such as predictions, but also accidents, coincidences and pure chance play a role 
in necessitating counterfactual reasoning. Although it is true that all causal analysis involves 
counterfactual reasoning (‘had X been otherwise, would Y have occurred?’), reflexivity and 
ontological chance introduce a further non-testable element into social sciences, making ex post 
falsification of predictions arduous. This reflects and further complicates the general methodologica l 
problem of studying open systems. In the absence of closure, decisive tests between theories are hard 
to come by. Ideological positions evolve easily and tend to fortify themselves rapidly.9 
Large-scale scenarios are often composites of multiple probability-judgements and conditiona l, 
reflexive predictions. In the absence of simple technical procedures to test any of these or the 
underlying theories, their rationality depends largely on whether the ethical guidelines of realist 
research are being followed. The more open we as researchers are to counterarguments, 
counterevidence and learning, the better; the more precise we make our claims and predictions, the 
easier their falsification and thus learning. This accords with the ethics of the scientific realist 
manifesto: ‘Scientific statements should be taken as true or false by virtue of the way the world is.’ 
Truth as a metaphor of correspondence has conduct-guiding force.10 
The good news is that while decisive falsification is often hard to achieve, it is possible to 
rationally revise our probability estimates also ex ante, both in relation to new evidence concerning 
the past and new world historical events and processes. For this we can use the Bayesian theorem, 
either literally (when we have numerical probability values) or metaphorically (normally, i.e. when 
we have only ordinal probability orders, based on intersubjective judgements about the weight of 
18 
available quantitative and qualitative evidence). The Bayesian theorem concerns a part-whole 
relationship.11 The key idea is that empirical research is an iterative process through which a new 
understanding of a whole emerges on the basis of openness to evidence and of gradually revising 
previous understandings. For example, if an original probability is very low, the Bayesian theorem 
implies that a single contrary occurrence does not necessarily increase probability even to a noticeable 
chance; but even in the case of a very low original probability, many like occurrences should have a 
cumulative effect of making a difference to our estimation of probabilities. (For more detailed 
discussion, see Patomäki 2010a: 154–61). 
When assessing the probability of a scenario, many relevant observations become availab le 
only in the course of history. A key problem is, of course, that we do not usually have numerica l 
values for the original probabilities. Furthermore, the new observations tend to be theory-laden 
descriptions of geo-historical events and processes rather than systematic quantifiable data. And yet, 
somehow the occurrence of these events and turns should slide the estimated probability in the 
direction of the occurrence in accordance with the basic intuition of the Bayesian theorem. The 
theorem helps to analyse the impact of an occurrence of something by decomposing the problem into 
smaller parts even when we do not have any numerical values. 
To continue the above example of three scenarios {A, B, C}, arguably the election of Barack 
Obama as the President of the US, and the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, have further (slightly) 
increased the likelihood of scenarios A (vis-à-vis scenarios B and C) and thus the relevance of the 
historical analogy to the era of 1870–1914. Obama has not made much of a difference in either way 
and the responses to financial and economic crisis have not involved attempts to build more 
sustainable common institutions, but have remained national and contradictory, while further 
strengthening the self-reinforcing process of neo-liberalisation (about the positive feedback loops via 
the mechanisms of learning, power and institutionalisation, see Patomäki 2008: 128–55). The world 
seems geared towards a path that makes a global military catastrophe progressively more likely. 12 
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When read as a prediction, this claim should be made more precise; but the point is also to shape 
history by warning about a dire possibility that is intrinsic to the ongoing processes. 
 
Conclusions: reflexive self-regulation of social systems and the pulse of freedom 
 
The point is not to try to reduce theory to the practical knowledge of state-leaders, diplomats, 
international civil servants and the like. What I have argued instead is that good theory should be 
practically adequate in the generic sense that it can inform diverse political practices by generating 
expectations about the world and about the results of our actions. In principle, we can let anticipated 
futures evolve more or less on their own or may advance them actively; alternatively, we can try to 
override the tendencies towards these anticipated futures, whenever there are good reasons for doing 
so. This is a primary ethical and political choice. 
I agree with Stefano Guzzini (2013: 530–38) that knowledge can move towards higher orders 
of reflexivity. By showing why there are no stable and uncontested empirical invariances, CR pushes 
both theoreticians and practitioners to critically reflect upon the conception of causation they have so 
far taken for granted. If there are no stable empirical regularities in open systems, then there can be 
no decisive tests between theories either. Rationality and openness to learning become ethical matters. 
Technical methods or interpretative readings of history or texts provide no firm grounds for 
knowledge. Rather, they are, at best, possible sources of counterevidence and counterarguments, 
encouraging revisions and enabling learning. 
The concept of cause is a metaphorical abstraction. Causation comes in different forms. It does 
not follow that causation is unreal. Nothing happens without being caused. The problem is that 
causation has typically been misunderstood by positivists and post-positivists alike. Causation works 
transfactually in open systems, i.e. as tendencies that may or may not bring about a given outcome, 
depending on the way different causal chains and processes coincide, coalesce and interact. Causation 
is irreversible but unending; the future is real but not yet fully determined. 
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The early CR thesis of radical asymmetry between explanation and prediction does not hold. 
The present is a moment of becoming, and makes reference – and is relative – to one or more ongoing 
processes. Most intertwined spatiotemporal processes are continuous across any given present. The 
future is also present in the moment of action, centred as it is on anticipating the future, whether 
implicitly or explicitly. We can and also do have systematic knowledge about various commitments, 
agreements, institutional arrangements and other ways of binding the social future. Moreover, as 
social scientists, we recognise that contrastive demi-regs and explanatory theories and models can 
have predictive value, too. If we understand the past and the present, we have many clues about the 
ways in which the future is already unfolding. 
Obviously explanation and prediction are not fully symmetrical either. Any present moment is 
open-ended: the properties of the actions and events happening ‘now’ depend, in part, on the 
processes that are gradually unfolding over time. In addition to the limits posed by epistemologica l 
chance, there are also ontological reasons why the future must remain open-ended at all relevant 
scales of time and space. In open systems, accidents, coincidences and pure chance are real 
phenomena. At the social/psychological level of reality, also reflexive predictions and human 
freedom play a role. Moreover, whereas structures generate transfactual tendencies, structures 
themselves are liable to changes. New forms of emergence and complexity are often unpredictab le , 
for it is difficult to anticipate what has not yet been put together, invented or created. In these senses, 
world history is open-ended. 
Guzzini (2013) stresses that knowledge can move towards higher orders of reflexivity. 
Reflexivity means the capacity of actors to reflect – in consciousness and discourse – on their own 
conditions and place, accepting that both can change and perhaps be changed. Reflexivity in the social 
sense turns on the internality of social science with respect to its subject-matter. Social scientific 
knowledge contributes to reflexive self-regulation. Reflexive self-regulation arises when knowledge 
about the way the social system functions is applied recursively in interventions that aim at avoiding 
unwanted or achieving desired outcomes. Arguably, when self-regulation is becoming increasingly 
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reflexive, holistic and future-oriented, the very temporality of human existence is being transformed. 
By shaping the future, actors are also changing the present, the meaning of the past, and the processes 
constitutive of their beingness. 
These ideas come close to Bhaskar’s (1993; 1994) dialectical CR and its idea of freedom. 
Dialectic is, formally, about the absenting of absence. Various ills – anything causally efficac ious 
that is not good – can be seen as constraints. Many ills as constraints, and thus as absences, can be 
absented over time. Less constraints means more freedom. Dialectic is about the onto-logic of change 
in the human sphere and, in some measure, in the biosphere as a whole. This onto-logic of change 
can also be conceived as the ground for various geo-historical processes of expanding freedom. In 
this normatively oriented theory of world history, agency is understood in terms of transformat ive 
praxis, which itself is bound to be transformed over time, following the same logic of intrins ic 
qualitative changes. Agency is oriented to rationally groundable projects. Autonomy as self-
determination, including the freedom of choice, is always a matter of degree, but has been and can be 
enlarged. 
The degree of freedom can be increased by replacing particular unnecessary and often 
misrepresented causal sources of determination with more wanted, needed and also more clearly 
evident sources of causal determination, classically implying attempts to increase one’s autonomy as 
self-determination. Despite the fundamental open-endedness of world history, Bhaskar argues further 
that there is a rational tendential directionality of history towards an increasing self-determining 
democratic control over the history of humankind, on this planet and perhaps elsewhere. 
I take this to mean that the future is in the process of coming to be increasingly (co-)determined 
by our normative discourse about its desirability, informed by adequate and plausible scenarios about 
possible and likely futures. Both increasing reflexivity and the notion that our temporality is likely to 
be changing are compatible with this emancipatory idea. Yet, the tendential rational directiona lity 
does not mean that actual world history would always be going into that direction, no matter what 
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scales of time we are talking about (say 10, 100 or 1000 years). The actual direction of world history 
depends also on what we do, apart from many other contingencies. 
1 See also the 2014 ISQ Symposium ‘The “Third Debate” 25 Years Later’, edited by Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson, which includes Lapid’s own reflections. While Lapid continues to find reasons 
to be optimistic about IR developments, Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach capture the 
prevailing state of the field of IR more realistically: 
The ‘Third Debate’ did not alter the views of the field’s positivists who continue to 
dominate many leading departments and journals especially in the United States, 
although thankfully far less so in Europe. […] [O]ne unintended and rather pitiful 
result of the Third Debate has been a proliferation of incommensurable post-positivist 
islands. Quite apart from the gate-keeper empiricists, we have subsequently moved 
from belated tolerance of diversity to an attitude of ‘anything goes’. […] And one 
unfortunate result of the Third Debate was to foster some perspectives that reflect 
thinly veiled ideological posturing rather than a genuine search for understanding. 
Worse, we believe, some are even less substantial than that. 
One implication is that for both the positivist mainstream and a number of those 
incommensurable post-positivist islands, CR and its main arguments about ontology and causation 
remain unfamiliar. The symposium is available at 
http://www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Posts/ID/304/25-Years-after-The-Third-Debate-Two-
pianissimo-bravos-for-IR-Theory. 
2 In its generic meaning – including many common sense versions of pragmatism – the term 
pragmatism refers to a mindset that sees thought as an instrument or tool for prediction, problem 






reality (or for ‘mirroring reality’). In philosophy, the term is first and foremost associated with the 
American philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such Charles Sanders 
Peirce, William James, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. To a certain degree, it is also 
associated with Richard Rorty, especially with his later postmodernist writings from 1979 onwards 
(criticised heavily by Bhaskar 1991). For discussions on pragmatism and IR, see e.g. Cochran 
(2002) and Bauer and Brighi (2011). Käpylä and Mikkola (2011) attempt to criticise CR from a 
Rortyan position and Hamati-Ataya (2012) claims that Morton Kaplan’s pragmatism can transcend 
the antagonism between positivism and post-positivism better than CR. 
3 In the works of Rom Harré (1970; 1979) and Andrew Sayer (1992; 2000; 2011) as well as in my 
own works (Patomäki 1992; 2002; 2010a), the practical and political aspects of realist causal 
explanations are more explicit and depicted in more positive light. 
4 Whether it was short-circuit or the presence of oxygen that caused the fire, the first answer raises 
further questions. What, then, caused the short-circuit? Perhaps a faulty mechanism, or some sort 
of human error? The line of posing further questions may lead to attributing moral or legal 
responsibility to someone; or may be related to, say, insurance claims; or may aim at improving 
(regulations concerning) the way electrical systems are constructed in houses. For further 
discussion on this theme, see also Humphreys 2016. 
5 An emergent property is one that is not possessed by any of the parts individually and that would 
not be possessed by the full set of parts in the absence of a structuring set of relations between 
them. There is a hierarchy of levels of organisational complexity from the strictly physical to the 
chemical and biological and finally to the social/psychological level. The social/psychologica l 
level is liable to rapid changes – much more rapid than at the biological level – involving also 
further and new forms of emergence. See Elder-Vass (2010: 16–20 et passim). 
6 See note 6 above. 
7 The early CR claim about a radical asymmetry between explanation and prediction amounts to 
saying that there is never anything of predictive value. In any context, there are always numerous 
24 
 
possible relevant causal forces, mechanisms and processes, perhaps existing at different levels of 
reality; and all of them are equally likely to contribute to the outcome. Therefore, only (theoretica l) 
and historical explanations are possible, and they must be conjunctural and retrodictive in their 
form. For instance, a flu epidemics spread in Moscow at the time when power struggle in the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union was about to reach its climax. Trotsky could not make the 
decisive meeting of the Politburo in late 1923 because he was ill, and Stalin seized the opportunity. 
Two causal chains coincided in an unpredictable way. We can trace coinciding causal processes 
backwards, but not forward (see e.g. Bhaskar 1979: 142). However, in a footnote, Bhaskar 
introduces a distinction between ‘theories which are explanatory but non-predictive (such as 
Darwin’s, Marx’s or Freud’s) and generalisations (for example, about capital-output ratios or 
suicide rates) which may be accurate predictors but are totally nonexplanatory’ (ibid.:178, n. 20). 
This is a step forward, but again the distinction is too categorical. Contrastive demi-regularit ies 
can be explained, too. Thus, explanatory theories in social sciences can have predictive value. Also 
vertical relations of analogies are grounded on this possibility. 
8 The logic of counterfactuals is: ‘if p then q’, when p is not true. From the point of view of modal 
logic, there is no difference between counterfactuals and scenarios, except tense. Counterfactua ls 
are about the past, scenarios about the future. They both operate with the concepts of necessary, 
possible, compossible, incompossible, contingent, plausible and probable. The evidence for 
assessing the plausibility and probability of different scenarios can only come, directly or 
indirectly, from the study of the past and present society. Analysis of these concepts and 
connections must be left to another paper, but the modal-logical similarity between counterfactua ls 
and scenarios is nicely explicated by Booth and Rowlinson (2009). For a discussion on the 
concepts of compossible and incompossible, see Jones and Jessop (2010). 
9 From this point of view, Bhaskar (1979: 144) analyses the consequences of the continuing 
hegemony of positivism. Because of the absence of decisive test situations, coupled with 
continuing one-sided allegiance to a mere predictive rather than explanatory and other criteria, the 
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methodology on which one’s research relies gets mystified; entrenched or otherwise privileged 
theory is protected; alternatives are stunt; and/or there is an encouragement of (a belief in) the 
unresolvability of theoretical conflicts – which, in practice, means their resolution in favour of the 
status quo. This explains quite nicely the current state of IR. While positivist methodologies are 
mystified, especially in the US, post-positivist alternatives are allowed to co-exist even in the US, 
while in Europe they are dominant in many places. Yet, in effect, in their practices, these 
‘incommensurable’ post-positivist islands tend to underpin the status quo; cf. note 1. 
10 It should be noted that in many science contexts, too, testing and falsification occur in open 
systems. Consider the case of epigenetics. Epigenetics is a heterogeneous field that focuses on 
non-genetic inheritance phenomena, comprising all meiotically and mitotically heritable changes 
in gene expression that are not coded in the DNA sequence itself. The real challenge is to combine 
the DNA and the epigenetic part of inheritance with the statistical explanations of ecologists. The 
test criteria typically involve multiply conditioned manipulations and observations of their effects; 
particularly checking whether effects remain invariant under a range of interventions. Researchers 
often know that an effect occurs without knowing why (no mechanism can be specified). For an 
illuminating discussion about the methodological difficulties of causal analysis in the context of 
epigenetics, see Baedke (2012). Analogically, also social scientists have to combine theoretica l 
models, geo-historical comparisons, trends and other demi-regs, thought-experiments, 
counterfactual reasoning, etc. to account for a variety of possible interventions and circumstances 
and to identify relevant structures, mechanisms, fields etc. (for an imaginative account of how to 
test claims, see Alker 1996).  
11 The basic idea is that we have a prior probability ratio for two hypotheses (that may describe 
something happening in the future) and then we have actual new evidence that seem to indicate a 
different likelihood ratio. We aim at maximum likelihood, but take into account the prior 
probability ratio in our probability-judgements. The result is supposed to be a balanced judgement. 
A bit more technically, the theorem says that a conditional probability for event or development B 
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given event or development A is equal to the conditional probability of A given B multiplied by 
the marginal probability of B and divided by the marginal probability for A (the sum of the 
conditional probability of A under all possible event Bi in the sample space). For basic texts on 
Bayesian statistics, see for example Bolstad (2004) and Lynch (2007). 
12 Since the global financial crisis and Obama’s election and first couple of years as the President of 
the US, further developments have reinforced this path, including the Euro crisis (as the second 
phase of the global crisis); the development of a new cycle of boom and (the foreseeable) bust in 
the global financial markets; failed attempts at democratisation and other maldevelopments in the 
Middle East; arms race in East Asia; and the conflict in Ukraine. For an argument that the 
continuous concentration of capital and the rising importance of past and inherited wealth in the 
sense of Piketty (2014) increase the likelihood of a major economic and political disaster, see 
Patomäki (2014). 
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